In this paper, we propose the first provable secure certificate-based proxy signature with message recovery without bilinear pairing. The notion of certificate-based cryptography was initially introduced by Gentry in 2003, in order to simplify certificate management in traditional public key cryptography (PKC) and to solve the key escrow problem in identity-based cryptosystems. To date, a number of certificate-based proxy signature (CBPS) schemes from bilinear pairing have been proposed. Nonetheless, the total computation cost of a pairing is higher than that of scalar multiplication (e.g., over elliptic curve group). Consequently, schemes without pairings would be more appealing in terms of efficiency. According to the available research in this regard, our scheme is the first provable secure CBPS scheme with message recovery which is based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. We prove the security of the presented scheme against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message and ID attacks in the random oracle model. Moreover, the paper will also show how it would be possible to convert this scheme to the CBPS scheme without message recovery. This scheme has more applications in situations with limited bandwidth and power-constrained devices.
Introduction
Proxy delegation of legal affairs is known as a common practice in formal interactions. In order to simplify the representation of the proxy signatures in the electronic world, the concept of proxy signature was first introduced by Mambo et al. in 1996 [1] which allows a designated person, called proxy signer, to sign on behalf of the original signer. The proxy signature plays an important role in many applications such as wireless e-commerce, mobile agents, and etc. [2] . However, the theory of proxy signature confronts with some problems when it comes to reality. In traditional public key cryptosystems (TPKC) or Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [3] , the communication and the validation (third party query, etc.) of a large number of public key of users, greatly affect the efficiency of the proxy signature schemes [4] . To simplify certificate management and to improve the proficiency of traditional PKI, Shamir [5] introduced Identity-based cryptology (IBC). It can solve the above-mentioned problem by using signer's identity such as email address or IP number as his public key while the corresponding private key will be a result of some mathematical operation that takes as input the user's identity and the master secret key of a trusted authority, referred to as Private Key Generator (PKG). The main practical advantage of IBC is in greatly reducing the need for public key certification. Certificate is provided implicitly in IBC and an explicit authentication of public key isn't required. The PKG generates the private key of all its users; therefore, key escrow becomes an inherent problem in IBC. It results in unconditional trust to PKG for a user. In addition, the PKG must send produced private key over secure channel, which makes secret key distribution a daunting task [6] . To fill the gap between traditional PKC and IBC, Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed a new paradigm called Certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC) [7] . In CLPKC, the KGC generates a partial secret key from the user's identity using the master secret key, while the user independently generates his own private/public keys. Decryption and signature generation require both the user private key and partial secret key. Therefore, CLPKC not only solves the key escrow problem, but also eliminates the use of certificates as in TPKC. Due to the lack of public key certificate, it is significant to assume that an adversary in the CLPKC system can replace the user's public key with any false key of its choice, which is also known as key replacement attack [4] . Cryptographic protocols in CLPKC system are easily suffered from this kind of attack. For example, the first CL-based signature scheme [7] is not secure against the key replacement attack [8, 9] . This problem was later fixed. We will not go through the detail, since it is out of the scope of the present paper. To read about the details of the key replacement attack in CL system the interested readers can refer [8, 9] .
In order to use the advantageous of the identity-based cryptology in the traditional cryptology, Gentry [6] introduced the notion of certificate-based encryption (CBE) in 2003, which combines public-key encryption (PKE) with IBE by preserving their merits. In CBE, each user generates his own private/public pair keys and requests a certificate of his public key from the CA, while the CA uses the key generation algorithm of an identity based encryption (IBE) scheme to generate the certificate. This certificate has all of the functions of a conventional PKI certificate. In addition, it can be used as a part of the signing key. The feature of implicit certification eliminates third-party queries for the certificate status. Since the CA does not know the personal secret keys of users, there is no key escrow problem in CBE, and since the CA's certificate need not be kept secret, there is no distribution of secret key problem. Nevertheless, a CBE scheme is inefficient when a CA covers a large number of users and performs frequent certificate updates [6, 10, 11] . However Gentry proposes using subset covers to overcome inefficiency [6] . In addition to CBE, in 2004, the notion of certificate based signature (CBS) was first proposed by Kang et.al [12] . They proposed two schemes, but unfortunately, one of their schemes was found insecure against key replacement attack [3] which was pointed out by Li et.al [13] , in addition, they proposed a notion of certificate-based proxy signature model. Since 2004, many certificate-based signature schemes were given [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] but just a few certificatebased proxy signature schemes have been proposed. In 2007, Wang et.al [14] proposed a certificate-based proxy cryptosystem with revocable proxy decryption power. In 2009, Jiguo Li et.al [11] proved that the certificate-based proxy signature scheme presented by Kang et.al isn't secure against key replacement attacks and they further proposed two provable secure certificate-based proxy signature schemes in the random oracle model. These two schemes don't have trust third party (CA) and in fact original signer acts as CA in the scheme. In 2010, Chen and Huang suggested a certificate-based proxy signature with trust third party but they couldn't present security proof in formal model for their scheme. Besides, Liang et.al [15] proposed a provable secure certificate-based strong designated verifier proxy signature scheme in random oracle model. All previous certificate-based proxy schemes that mentioned above require pairing operations which is one of the costly operations compared to the other operations such as Elliptic Curve exponentiation. Till now, there is not any certificate-based proxy signature scheme without bilinear pairing, that is why the present study will propose it. Accordingly schemes without pairing would be more appropriate to be implemented in power-constrained devices, such as wireless sensor networks, etc. [16] . The proxy signature scheme with message recovery is a digital signature scheme in which the original message of the signature does not need to be transmitted in addition to the proxy signature since it has been appended to the signature and can be recovered according to the verification/message recovery process. This type of signature is different from a signcryption scheme or authenticated encryption schemes, because in proxy signature with message recovery scheme, the embedded message can be recovered by everyone without the secret information. The purpose of proxy signature scheme with message recovery is to degrade the total length of the original message and the appended signature [16] . Therefore, these are useful in any application where bandwidth is one of the main concerns or small message should be signed. Recently, Singh and Verma [16] proposed the first pairing based proxy signature scheme with message recovery and proved that their scheme is provable secure but Tian et.al [17] showed that Singh's scheme isn't secure. Afterwards, Padhay et.al [4] proposed a certificateless proxy signature with message recovery and they could show that their scheme is secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message and ID attacks.
Our Contributions
In the present paper, we propose the first provable secure certificate-based proxy signature without pairing with message recovery scheme. In our scheme, message can be recovered from the signature; hence, message doesn't need to be transmitted along with the signature which gains smaller communication cost compared with the schemes without message recovery [4] . It is claimed by the researchers of the present study that the scheme proposed here is secure against adaptive chosen message and ID attack in random oracle model based on ECDLP. What follows represents different sections of the paper: Section 2 defines security model of our CBPS scheme. Section 3, presents a novel CBPS scheme with message recovery scheme based on the given model and it will be shown how it would be possible to convert this scheme to the CBPS scheme without message recovery. Then, in Section 4, the security of our scheme is analyzed. Eventually, in Section 5, concludes the paper.
Models of certificate-based proxy signature

Definition
Let be an original signer with identity and is be one of his proxy signers with identity . A warrant message is used in order to delegate the signing rights which contain the identities of original and proxy signers, period of delegation, message type, scope of authorization of proxy signer, and etc. Our model is inspired by [10] . A CBPS scheme consists of four entities: certification authority (CA), original signer, proxy signer, verifier and six algorithms: Setup, UserKeyGen, CertGen, ProxyKeyGen, PSign and PSVerif/MRecovery. , original signer's and proxy signer's identities, public keys of proxy signer and original signer and proxy signature as input, and recovers the message with redundant data. If the message conforms to the redundancy data, the correctness of the proxy signature is verified.
Security Model.
To evaluate the security of CBPS schemes, according to [4, 11, 12] , two kinds of adversaries with the different capabilities are defined: the adversary type 1, , and type 2, . Adversary type 1, : Acts as a malicious user which doesn't have the master private key, , but can corrupt any user (including the various proxy and original signers) except target original/proxy signers. Moreover, he can replace user's public key with any value which is chosen by him with limitation that he cannot obtain the certificate of the false public keys [11] .
Adversary type 2, : Acts as a malicious CA which has the master private key, , but is not able to replace the user's public key [11] . Existential unforgeability against Adversary In this subsection, capabilities of will be considered. Informally, the scenarios of an attack will be considered where the goal of an adversary is forging a valid CBPS under the warrant message, , and the public key while, he doesn't know the certificate and the delegation of the warrant. It should be noted that the public key might be the fake one chosen by the adversary or the genuine one generated by the user ID. Actually, has the following capabilities [11] :
1-can access some message/signature pairs which are generated by the proxy signer with identity . 2-can replace the public key of the user with identity with which is chosen by himself. He can also dupe any other third party to verify user signatures with the false public key .
3-If
has replaced the user public key with any value which is chosen by himself, he can't access the certificate of the false public key and the delegation of warrant from the original signer. In this model, the is allowed to replace the target user's public key with any value chosen by himself however, he can't obtain the certificate of the user's public key and the delegation of the warrant. Moreover, is allowed to corrupt any proxy signer except target proxy signer in the system.
Definition 1
An adversary is called a -forger if it has the advantage of at least in the above game which runs in time at most and makes at most and create, signing and random oracle queries, respectively. Accordingly, a scheme is called to -secure against or actually unforgeable against chosen message an ID attack if no -forger exists [4] .
Existential unforgeability against Adversary
The existential unforgeability of a CBPS for an adversary , needs that it is hardship for CA to generate a valid proxy signature of the message without helping of the proxy signer.
has the following capabilities [11] :
1-knows the master private key, . 2-can access some message/signature pairs which are generated by the proxy signer with identity . 3-can't replace the public key of the any user in the system.
The security of our CBPS is defined by the following game between and the challenger .
 Setup: The challenger executes the Setup algorithm and returns the system parameters to .  UserKeyGen Query: On the query if already has been created, nothing is to be carried out by . Otherwise, runs UserKeyGen algorithm and access the user secret/public key pair , then it adds to the list. In both cases, is returned to . 
Definition 2
An adversary is called a -forger if it has the advantage of at least in the above game which runs in time at most and makes at most and create, signing and random oracle queries, respectively. Hence, a scheme is called -secure against or actually unforgeable against chosen message an ID attack if no -forger exists [4] .
Definition 3
A challenger is called an -solver if it can solve the ECDLP (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem) with unnegligible probability at least in time at most .
Proposed scheme
In the present section, the first CBPS scheme with message recovery over ECC without pairings is proposed. Our scheme is inspired by [4] and [18] . The security of scheme is based on ECDLP assumption and will be proved in random oracle model. The proposed scheme consists of four entities: certification authority (CA), original signer, proxy signer, verifier and six algorithms: Setup, UserKeyGen, CertGen, ProxyKeyGen, PSign and PSVerif/MRecovery. In the scheme, we apply the symbol which denotes an elliptic curve over a prime finite field . Let be a cyclic subgroup of the elliptic curve group with generator of order . Our proposed scheme is based on the ECDLP assumption, i.e. for given in , computing such that is intractable [4] . Setup CA gets a security parameter and returns system parameters as follows:
1) Chooses a -bit prime and chooses the tuple defined as above.
2) Chooses the master private key, , and computes the master public key . 3) Chooses secure cryptographic hash functions , and . 4) Finally publishes tuple as system parameters and keeps secret as the master private key.
UserKeyGen
Each user
with identity randomly picks and using system parameters , generates his/her public/private key pairs respectively (during the scheme, , represent the identity of original signer and proxy signer respectively). CertGen 1) User , transmits his/her public key and identity via an authenticated channel to the CA. 2) CA chooses at random and computes tuple as certificate of user as follows. CA transmits user certificate to his/her via an authenticated channel.
(
3) User can validate its certificate by checking whether the following holds:
The original signer , after generation the warrant , chooses at random and computes delegation as follows and transmits tuple to his/her proxy signer, .
2) The proxy signer , after receiving the delegation , first computes and values using equations (2) and (6) then checks whether the relation (8) holds. ( 8 ) 3) If the equation (8) 
PSign
In this step, proxy signer , computes his signature on the message using system parameters and proxy key as follows: 1) Chooses at random and computes following value. ( 11 ) 2) Computes parameter from equation (12) . Where denotes the first coordinates of point from elliptic curve group. ( 12 ) 3) Computes the value and signature as follows: ( 13 ) ( 14 ) 4) The proxy signature will be the tuple .
PSVerif/MRecovery
In order to verify the signature on the message , the verifier acts as follows:
1) Check authorization of the proxy signer in the warrant and .
2) Computes
، ، ، values from equations (2, 6 and 9). 3) Computes the value from equation (15) .
4) The correctness of the message and the proxy signature is verified if the hash result of the first part of is equal to the second part of .
Correctness
According to the equations (10, 11, and 14) we have:
On the other, according to the equation (13), the value is: . Accordingly, we have: ( 17 ) To convert this scheme to a CBPS scheme without bilinear pairing and without message recovery, the PSign and PSVerif steps should be modified as follows:
PSign
In this step, proxy signer , computes his signature on the message using system parameters and proxy key as follows: 1) Chooses at random and computes following values: ( 18 ) ( 19 ) 2) Checks whether the equation (20) (23). ( 21 ) 6) The proxy signature will be the tuple .
PSVerify
In order to verify the signature on the message , the verifier does as follows:
1) Checks authorization of the proxy signer in the warrant and . 
Security Analysis of the Scheme
In this section, we will prove that our scheme is secure against adaptive chosen message and ID attack in the random oracle model under the difficulty of resolving ECDLP.
Theorem. The proposed scheme is -secure against and adversaries in the random oracle model [4] .
Proof. Suppose that
or is -adversary such that can forge the proposed certificate-based proxy signature with probability greater than . In this case, it will be shown that, the challenger would be a solver whereas and are calculated from the following equations [4] :
Proof against . Suppose that the challenger is tasked to solve discrete logarithm problem on the elliptic curves (ECDLP). Hence, for example if and are two points on the elliptic curve such that , the purpose of the challenger is computing . In order to do this, picks two identities and randomly as the challenged identities in the following game and gives to . Afterwards, responds queries as follows: In this case, performs the game with for more six times again with variables , , and and constant parameters , . Similar to the presentation of security proof against , with using achieved seven linearly independent equations apparently, it will exist a simple algorithm to solve the seven linearly independent equations with seven unknowns and outputs as a solution of ECDLP. If the seven independent equations aren't linear, this process is repeated up to the attainment of seven linearly independent equations.
Advantage
In response to the CertGen query, if assigns the conflicting value for random oracle , the simulation of certificate generation oracle fails. This case happens with probability at most . Since there are at most certificate generation queries and signing queries, so simulation of certificate generation oracle would be successful at most times with probability at least . Furthermore, it is assumed that random oracles have ideal randomness behavior. Therefore, according to the three queries , and with probility at least ( ), makes a correct response of such a query at the point of representation with probability at least ( ) . Thus, the overall success probability will be at least ( ) ( ) ( ) and the overall time to complete the algorithm, dominated by the exponentiations performed in the certificate generation and signing queries, which is equal to [4] .
Conclusion
With respect to the performance of the certificate-based infrastructure in comparison with the other public key infrastructures in addition to the performance of the schemes without bilinear pairing compared to the other similar schemes, a certificate-based proxy signature scheme without bilinear pairing will be an efficient one. In the present study, a certificatebased proxy signature scheme without bilinear pairing is proposed which is capable of message recovery; hence, the message doesn't need to be sent along with the signature, which saves storage space and communication bandwidth. The security of the scheme is proved in the random oracle model and it has been proved that the presented scheme of this study is secure against adaptive chosen message and ID attack for two types of the adversaries.
